Patient and Physician Autonomy: Conflicting Rights and Obligations in the Physician-Patient Relationship by Pellegrino, Edmund D.
Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) 
Volume 10 Issue 1 Article 8 
1994 
Patient and Physician Autonomy: Conflicting Rights and 
Obligations in the Physician-Patient Relationship 
Edmund D. Pellegrino 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp 
Recommended Citation 
Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient and Physician Autonomy: Conflicting Rights and Obligations in the 
Physician-Patient Relationship, 10 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 47 (1994). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp/vol10/iss1/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) by an authorized editor of CUA Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
PATIENT AND PHYSICIAN AUTONOMY:
CONFLICTING RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS IN THE PHYSICIAN-
PATIENT RELATIONSHIP*
Edmund D. Pellegrino, M.D.**
For centuries, physician beneficence went unchallenged as the first
principle of medical ethics. To be sure, some physicians had, at times,
violated this principle. But no creditable ethical opposition was mounted
until a quarter of a century ago when patient autonomy was asserted as a
prima facie moral principle of equal or greater weight than beneficence.'
Progressively since then, patient autonomy has become the dominant
principle shaping physician-patient relationships.
Three serious moral conflicts have emerged as a result: first, benefi-
cence and autonomy have been polarized against each other when they
should be complementary; second, the physician's moral claim to auton-
omy has received little attention; and third, the "autonomy" of medical
ethics, itself, has come under a serious threat. This essay will examine
each of these three consequences resulting from the rise of patient auton-
omy. It shall do so from the point of view that the physician-patient rela-
tionship is a moral equation with rights and obligations on both sides and
that it must be balanced so that physicians and patients act beneficently
toward each other while respecting each other's autonomy. Effecting this
balance is a morally mandatory and exacting exercise. The compass-
points that might guide this balancing are to be found in a reflection on
the concepts of autonomy and beneficence, the way the content of these
abstract notions is provided by the clinical encounter, and the way con-
flicts may be resolved in particular clinical situations.
Out of this reflection, five conclusions will emerge: (1) in concept, au-
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tonomy and beneficence are complementary and not contradictory; (2) in
theory and in practice, autonomy is a positive as well as a negative princi-
ple; (3) the actual content of the concepts of beneficence and autonomy is
defined in specific actions and decisions in the light of which conflicts are
best understood and resolved; (4) the physician's autonomy as a person
and a professional must be factored into the equation; and (5) medical
ethics, as an enterprise, must maintain .a certain "autonomy" in the face
of political and socio-economic pressures.
I. THE CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY
A. Autonomy in General
Autonomy is one of those widely applauded concepts which, on closer
inspection, turns out to be difficult to define with precision.2 This is not
the place to review the range of construals of the term. Rather, I will
limit myself to that construal which centers on the etymology of the word
itself, which means "self-rule." What is common to most definitions is the
notion that an autonomous person is one who, in his thoughts, words, and
actions, is able to follow those norms he chooses as his own without ex-
ternal constraints or coercion by others.'
The history of the concept is complex, and its roots are political as well
as moral. Politically, autonomy came into prominence during the En-
lightenment as an assertion of the individual's right to be free from tyran-
nous government - not of law per se, but of unjust law.4 Morally,
autonomy encompasses the right of persons to freedom of conscience and
to respect as agents capable of making their own judgments in accord
with universal moral principles,5 or in accord with freely arrived at
decisions.6
Autonomy gets its status as a moral right of humans from the fact that
human beings have the capacity to make rational judgments about their
own lives, choices, and interests. Self-governance deserves respect be-
cause it is the way human beings actualize their powers of choice, and
choice is a distinctly human activity. To obstruct the capacity for auton-
2. GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 3-6, 12-20
(1988).
3. This is a paraphrase of the essentials of Dworkin's use of the term. Id. at 7-12.
4. See JOHN LOCKE, LOCKE'S SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT (Lester
DeKoster ed., 1978).
5. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (James W.
Ellington trans., 1981).
6. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978).
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omy is to assault an essential part of a person's humanity, because the
choices we make are so much an expression of our membership in the
human community, of who we are or what we want to be as individual
members of that community. Human beings are owed respect for their
autonomy because they have an inherent dignity. They do not have dig-
nity because they are autonomous. Human beings who lack or have lost
the capacity for autonomous actions are nonetheless humans who retain
their inherent dignity. Respect for persons comprises more than respect
for autonomy.
Autonomy has taken on a distinctive negative connotation. Arising, as
it did, as a moral claim against invasion of human rights by tyrannous
government, it has come to mean a right of self-determination against
those who would usurp that right. In medical ethics, it is conceived
largely as a moral and legal defense against physician paternalism and
against those who would impose their values - social, moral, or other-
wise - on others.
But autonomy is also a positive concept. It implies an obligation to
foster the human capacity for self-determination, to enhance it, and to
remove the obstacles to its full operation. This is especially important in
clinical medical ethics where pathophysiological, emotional, and social re-
alities complicate the actualization of patient autonomy. If taken as a
strictly negative concept of non-interference, autonomy can be self-de-
feating for patients and self-serving for physicians. This positive aspect of
autonomy will become clearer as I fill in the content of the concept as it
operates in the clinical situation.
B. Patient Autonomy and Physician Beneficence
Twenty-five years ago, the political and moral notion of autonomy was
appropriated as one of the prima facie principles of medical ethics.7
There were good reasons for the emergence of patient autonomy at that
time. The rights of patients to refuse unwanted treatment had been ne-
glected for entirely too long. In the mid-sixties, these rights could no
longer be denied as participatory democracy, better public education, and
the civil rights movements became realities. All authority claims came
under suspicion. The abuses of professional and bureaucratic power were
widely publicized and no longer tolerable. Moreover, the unprecedented
powers of medicine made the choice of medical treatments a far more
significant matter than it had ever been in the past.
7. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1.
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The principle of patient autonomy was seen as the patient's protection
against usurpation of his right to participate in decisions that affected his
life. This amounted to a denial of the long tradition of medical paternal-
ism (or parentalism), which considered the duty of physicians to decide
what was best because the patient lacked medical knowledge and might
lose hope if he knew the whole truth about his options or prognosis.
Since paternalists acted in the name of beneficence, beneficence was
equated with paternalism and thereby came to be interpreted as a
counter-principle to autonomy. Morally valid and invalid forms of benef-
icence and autonomy were not distinguished from each other. The dilem-
mas of medical decision-making soon were reduced to weighing the
principles of autonomy and beneficence against each other.'
Medical paternalism and parentalism, however, are not to be equated
with beneficence, conceptually or in practice. Paternalism does not ac-
count for the patient's preferences or values that are part and parcel of
her good or best interests. 9 Paternalism makes the medical good of the
patient the only good and subverts other goods to that good. Paternalism
violates the patient's autonomy in the name of the patient's best interests
while ignoring or overriding some of the most vital of tnose interests.
This cannot be a beneficent act because the patient's own choices are so
much an expression of his or her own life story or personhood. To violate
or ignore the patient's choices is, by definition, a maleficent act, an injury
to the patient's humanity. Only when the patient's human capacity to act
autonomously is impaired (i.e., when the patient is incompetent) may we
resort to paternalism as a beneficent act to override objections to
treatment. 10
This is the negative aspect of autonomy. Important as it is, it is a dis-
tortion of the idea of autonomy to equate it with total independence from
the physician or others in making treatment decisions. The cultural bias
against dependence or even the semblance of dependence is strong in
American life. However, total independence is unrealistic in any walk of
life. ,Human beings live in community and personal association, espe-
cially when they are patients. Patients especially need the input of others
if their own choices are to be genuine ones. Physicians are needed to
8. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & LAWRENCE B. MCCULLOUGH, MEDICAL ETHICS: THE
MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF PHYSICIANS 22-51 (1984).
9. See EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO & DAVID C. THOMASMA, FOR THE PATIENT'S
GOOD: THE RESTORATION OF BENEFICENCE IN HEALTH CARE 23-25 (1988).
10. JAMES F. CHILDRESS, WHO SHOULD DECIDE?: PATERNALISM IN HEALTH CARE
102 (1982).
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provide information and to discuss this information with patients to en-
able and empower them to use their autonomy wisely. Patients must
compare their values with those of others in the context of some commu-
nity of belief which they accept in whole or in part. Patients cannot iden-
tify with their current choices without reference to some structure of
values which they formed in the past and which they reaffirm or reject at
the moment of choice. This is part of knowing ourselves, and we know
ourselves largely in relation to others.
As Dworkin points out, autonomy implies a "capacity to reflect upon
one's motivational structure and make changes in that structure."11
Without associating with others and drawing on their preferences and val-
ues, we lack the opportunity to alter or reaffirm our values because we do
not know what alternatives are available and why they might be prefera-
ble. To move from the abstract realm of concept to, actual decisions, au-
tonomy needs content, and this comes from reflection not only on our
own past values but on the values of others at the moment of choice. It is
the physician's obligation to enhance, empower, and enrich the patient's
capacity to be autonomous. An autonomous choice requires that we fill
in, to the extent possible, the action or choice that maximizes realization
of the patient's values. Thus, autonomy has a positive as well as a nega-
tive aspect. To become a reality, patient autonomy requires cooperation
and assistance from the physician. In short, it requires the physician's
beneficent attention to make the patient's autonomy an authentic, as well
as an independent, reality.
C. Physician Autonomy
In all the current discussions about the moral status of patient auton-
omy, the autonomy of the physician is often neglected. This philosophy
has serious defects. The physician-patient relationship is one of mutual
obligation - like any truly ethical relationship. The physician as a
human being has the same claim to respect for his or her capacity. to
make personal choices, to follow his or her conscience about what is good
medicine and what is morally acceptable as a person. Personal and pro-
fessional ethics are not fully separable from each other. Therefore, the
patient's moral right of autonomy must be balanced with respect for the
physician's autonomy. Autonomy cannot be a unilateral moral right for
either patients or physicians.
Physician autonomy may be considered under three headings: (1) au-
11. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 108.
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tonomy as a person, which gives moral status to the physician's personal
moral values and conscience; (2) autonomy as a physician, which gives
moral status to the physician's knowledge and obligation to use it wisely
and well; and (3) autonomy as a member of a profession, of a moral com-
munity with collective obligations to patients and society. I have written
elsewhere 2 of the moral obligations and the autonomy of medicine as a
moral community, and will confine myself here only to the first two con-
struals of the physician's autonomy as an individual.
The autonomy of the physician as a person has its roots in the same
ground as the autonomy of any other person (i.e., the physician's capacity
as a person for rational judgment and expression of preference with re-
spect to values and choices). The physician, therefore, cannot be ex-
pected to lay aside or ignore his deeper personal beliefs, values, or
religious commitments. To be sure, patient autonomy requires that the
physician not impose his values in his decisions for the patient. But pa-
tient autonomy cannot require the physician to sacrifice his personal
moral integrity even for what the patient may believe to be a morally
good purpose.
Respect for the physician's autonomy also derives from the fact that,
under normal circumstances, the physician must write the orders that are
carried out by others. The physician cannot avoid the fact that she is the
focal point through which harm and benefit of a clinical decision will flow
in a majority of cases. The physician therefore is a de facto moral accom-
plice in what happens to her patient. She cannot place responsibility on
others for morally indefensible decisions or for cooperation in decisions
that violate her conscience. This inescapable fact of the physician-patient
relationship places unavoidable obligation on the physician to avoid ac-
tion she deems harmful to her patient, even if that action is "required" by
state regulation, policy, or law.1
3
The physician's autonomy as a physician is also grounded in the posses-
sion of expert knowledge needed by sick people and society. The power,
itself, conferred de facto by the possession of such knowledge, demands
that the physician be free to use it according to her best judgment. 4 If
the physician is to fulfill the moral requirement to make her knowledge
12. Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Medical Profession as a Moral Community, 66 BULL.
N.Y. ACAD. MED. 221 (1990).
13. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Societal Duty and Moral Complicity: The Physician's Di-
lemma of Divided Loyalty, 16 INr'L J.L. & PSYCHiATRY 371 (1993).
14. See David M. Mirvis, Physicians' Autonomy - The Relation Between Public and
Professional Expectations, 328 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1346 (1993).
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available to those who need it, she must be allowed sufficient discretion-
ary latitude to apply that knowledge as rationally, efficiently, and safely
as possible. This is essential if physicians are to fulfill their part of the
covenant with society and with individual patients. Physicians enter this
covenant from the first day in medical school, when they accept the privi-
leges and the obligations that go with the acquisition of medical knowl-
edge and skill.' 5
Clearly, this third sense of physician autonomy can never be absolute.
If the physician is incompetent, acts in his own self-interest, or acts pater-
nalistically in the sense I defined earlier, he misuses his expertise and
violates his covenant with both the patient and society. That covenant is
based on trust in the doctor's Oath which commits him to use his knowl-
edge primarily in the service of the sick.
The physician's autonomy as a physician is also limited when she mis-
takes medical expertise and authority for expertise in questions of values.
The physician has no standing as an expert in human values and no au-
thority to set the goals or priorities .of public policy relative to the alloca-
tion or distribution of health care resources. To be sure, the physician's
knowledge provides essential factual data on which rational social policy
should be based. But the actual choices of values are not the prerogative
of physicians or any other "experts" - politicians, economists, or even
ethicists. Social value questions are a matter of concern for the whole of
society. In this respect, the expert is like any other member of society
with no authority over the values of other individual members of that
society or over the society as a whole. The arguments of experts may
have more cogency but no more authority than those of others.
II. AUTONOMY: ITS CONTENT IN THE CLINICAL CONTEXZ
Autonomy in general, and physician and patient autonomy in particu-
lar, might conceivably be defined in the abstract in some general way
congenial to a large number of people. However, when we begin to give
it content in the context of illness, the problems with absolutism and ab-
straction become evident, as do the implications of autonomy as a solely
negative moral right.
First of all,. no two persons experience illness the same way. No two
persons have the same way of expressing their capacity for autonomous
choice. Very few patients demand only "the facts." Some will seek a
15. Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Ethics of Medical Education, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF BioETHics (Warren T. Reich ed., forthcoming 1994).
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wide variety of opinions before deciding on their own; some will not.
Some patients will prefer to exercise their autonomy by giving it up to a
surrogate (i.e., someone they trust to make the decision for them, or per-
haps even the physician). The majority will want to express their own
way of being autonomous by asking not only for facts, but also for the
doctor's opinion and the opinions of family and friends.
Thus, the content of the idea of autonomy, when it is actualized, will
vary with the patient's prior values and cultural, personal, and social rela-
tionships. These, in turn, condition a patient's response to illness. Sick-
ness forces a confrontation with the self and with the need to adapt to this
illness, here and now. Sickness is a test of our values. For each of us, our
response to sickness is unique, and thus the way we express our auton-
omy is also unique.'6 Patients will vary in the degree of dependence or
independence they desire depending on their relationship with the physi-
cian, on their relationship to their society or community, and on the de-
gree of trust they impute to others.
Second, no matter what degree and kind of autonomy a patient
chooses, the very fact of illness physiologically or psychologically com-
promises the actual expression of autonomy to some degree. The sick
person is dependent on the physician's knowledge and help; otherwise
she would not need or seek medical help. In addition, in varying degrees,
she is in pain, anxious, fearful, and vulnerable. Brain function may be
temporarily or permanently compromised by fever, shock, medication,
age, or dementia.
To restore autonomy, physicians must first attend to reversing these
physiological and psychological impediments- to the optimal exercise of
autonomy. In such cases, medical treatment is essential to restore auton-
omy. This may require temporarily downplaying or overriding the pa-
tient's autonomy until normal sensorial states are attained, and then
enhancing and empowering it as the capacity for self-determination re-
turns.' During this transition, beneficence (i.e., acting in the patient's best
interest) modulates the physician's move from "weak" paternalism to en-
hancement of the patient's full autonomy.
Third, no matter what degree of autonomy a patient may want or in
what way he wants to express it, the patient is vulnerable to deception in
the information he receives. The patient is dependent on the physician's
disclosure of diagnosis, prognosis, treatment options, side effects, effec-
16. George J. Agich, Reassessing Autonomy in Long-Term Care, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 12.
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tiveness, outcomes, etc. Which facts the physician chooses, which she em-
phasizes, and which she represses are often subtly or frankly conditioned
by her judgment of what she thinks is in the patient's best interests. As
any clinician knows, she can get almost any decision she wants from most
patients. Therefore, even the most conscientious physician must exert
great care to avoid manipulating the patient's choices, even for good rea-
sons. The fact that physicians can so easily influence the patient's choice
makes the full operation of patient autonomy problematic. For that very
reason, it is morally incumbent on the physician to protect patient auton-
omy as scrupulously as possible and to try to help the patient realize its
positive content.
This cannot mean, as some erroneously argue, that autonomy in a sick
person is a fiction, that to try to enhance it is a sham, and that we should
return to the Hippocratic tradition of benign authoritarianism. Such a
reversal would be an intolerable suppression of the patient's human right
as a rational being to make uncoerced choices. Physicians and others,
therefore, have an obligation not to take advantage of the patient's vul-
nerability. Informed consent is an empty notion or a charade if the infor-
mation on which it is based is biased in favor of the physician's
preferences.
None of this means that physicians cannot advise or persuade patients
to do what they think is right. Not to do so is a species of moral abandon-
ment. Patients are entitled to know what physicians think is "best," all
things considered. Although the extremes of this spectrum are not diffi-
cult to identify, no one can draw precise lines between advice, persuasion,
manipulation, and coercion. But the difficulty of drawing a line does not
justify a presumption in favor of paternalism. Rather, it increases the
physician's obligation in beneficence to protect autonomy by the most
scrupulous self-examination of his own motives in obtaining conseni.
Much, therefore, still depends on the physician's character and sensitiv-
ity and her possession of the virtue of benevolence. The physician's char-
acter may turn out to be the last safeguard of the patient's autonomy and
well-being. But, ultimately, the physician and patient must decide to-
gether what is to be done. Only in this way can patient autonomy be-
come a cooperative and beneficent enterprise, rather than an adversarial
one.
All of this applies with special force to surrogate decisionmaking and to
advance directives, which become operative when a competent patient
loses the capacity to make his own decisions. Here, the patient's wishes
19941
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are represented by others or by a written document. The surrogate's
wishes have the moral status we usually attribute to a competent patient
and should be respected as such. However, family and friends can be in a
financial or emotional conflict of interest with the welfare of an incompe-
tent patient. They may even wish, consciously or subconsciously, to re-
lieve themselves of the emotional and physical burdens of caring for a
chronically ill person. Their representations of what the patient's autono-
mous decision would have been were he competent are open to serious
question.
When "autonomy" is expressed in a living will or other advance direc-
tive, an assessment must be made of whether the decision executed in the
past, when a person was competent, represents what the patient would
want now, when the patient is no longer competent. Is this person, now
in a persistent vegetative state, the same person who originally made out
that living will? Is autonomy, in its full meaning, so absolute that it binds
us to decisions the benefits and the import of which the patient could not
possibly have anticipated, and which, in the actual context of a particular
decision, may not be in his present interests?
In these circumstances, the patient is in need of a beneficent agent -
one who can be trusted to protect him or her from the autonomous deci-
sions of others, even those who might be legally, but not morally, valid
surrogates. This agent may have to be the physician, nurse, or other
health professional who acts under the principle of beneficence. Regard-
less of whether the surrogate is a family member, friend, or the health
professional, when the patient's autonomy has been transferred to others,
it must be held in trust. If that trust is violated, the surrogate loses her
moral status as well as her "autonomy" to make choices for the patient.
Not enough attention has been given to the limitations placed on the
"Western" notion of autonomy when applied to the care of patients from
different cultural backgrounds. Even in the "West," as Surbone points
out in the case of Italian culture, patients may not expect or want to make
decisions, preferring to leave them to families or the physician.' 7 Is it a
beneficent or maleficent act to insist on or offer autonomous decision-
making in these circumstances? Is it morally wrong, or rather a legiti-
mate compromise, to work within the patient's cultural confines? Are we
compelled by the fundamental nature of the principle of "respect for per-
sons" to impose our view of autonomy, or may we compromise it in the
name of cultural integrity?
17. See Antonella Surbone, Truth Telling to the Patient, 268 JAMA 1661 (1992).
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These nuances in the 'full expression of patient autonomy in clinical
decisions underscore the fact that autonomy cannot function in actuality
without beneficence. Beneficence, properly exercised, is the guarantor of
autonomy, rather than its enemy. Enhancing autonomy, enabling and
empowering the patient to make her own choices, and helping the patient
to understand the choices before her in terms of her own past values are
all acts of beneficence. These acts enhance the positive content of auton-
omy and are crucial to any comprehensive notion of the patient's welfare.
On this view, the health professional holds the patient's autonomy in
trust. While it must be protected, it cannot be divorced from beneficence.
It requires the physician's involvement, not her disengagement. In short,
if the positive content of the concept of autonomy is to be realized, it will
require beneficent action on the part of the health professional.
I must emphasize this point because the current pressure to assure pa-
tient independence is eliciting two morally dangerous responses on the
part of health professionals. One response is to emphasize the negative
non-interference dimension of autonomy. This negative conception of
autonomy reduces the ethics of the physician-patient encounter to proce-
dure rather than substance. On this view, as long as the procedure allows
for autonomy, all is well. Autonomy is absolutized in principle and prac-
tice. This may lead to the second response, namely, that physicians will
accede to whatever the patient or valid surrogate wants. This prompts
the physician to transfer all responsibility to patients, family or friends.
This occurs with alarming frequency in the care of infants, the elderly,
and demented patients who may be over- or under-treated because their
surrogates demand it.
Indeed, one of the most important contributing factors to disagreement
between family surrogates and health professionals is the psychological
burden family surrogates carry when they must decide whether to discon-
tinue life support measures. Here, the autonomy owed the patient is
transferred to the valid surrogate. In such cases, families often feel they
are being asked to sentence a loved one to death or, by their decision, are
actually participating in the death of the patient. They need reassurance
when the medical situation is one which, in the eyes of the physician, is
"hopeless." Physicians cannot simply leave the entire burden to the sur-
rogate or even the patient. They must share that burden.
Thus, detachment is not a beneficent act. Often, when families or pa-
tients ask that "everything" be done, they are seeking reassurance that
everything that could be effective or beneficial be done, not that "every-
thing" - irrespective of probabilities of success - be done. They also
1994]
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want to share their responsibility for cessation of life-support with the
doctor. The focus of ethical concern may well shift, however, from the
substantive to the procedural when irreconcilable conflict about what
constitutes beneficence or the patient's best interests occurs.
IV. CHALLENGES TO PHYSICIAN AUTONOMY
A seriously neglected facet of the growing dominance of patient auton-
omy is its impact on the physician's autonomy. The physician-patient re-
lationship, like any ethical relationship, is a reciprocal one. in the
justifiable concern for patient autonomy, it is easy to forget that the phy-
sician is a moral agent as well as the patient. As such, the physician's
autonomy, as well as the patient's, is deserving of respect. When the two
are in conflict, the patient's wish does not automatically trump the physi-
cian's. The physician's autonomy, like the patient's, has its negative and
positive construals.
It may seem paradoxical to worry about physician autonomy when it is
the patient who is vulnerable and the doctor who holds the knowledge
and power the patient needs. This fact rightly imposes the heavier moral
burden on the physician in the equilibration of the autonomy relation-
ship. He cannot use his claim to autonomy to violate the patient's capac-
ity to make self-governing choices. But the physician is, like the patient,
a human being, entitled to respect for his capacity to reason, judge and
make choices that are authentically "his." He cannot impose his values
on the patient, just as the patient cannot impose hers on the physician.
The physician-patient relationship is a moral equation with reciprocal
rights and obligations.
Today, that equation is becoming unbalanced as patient autonomy is
elevated to the status of a trumping principle, morally as well as legally.
For some, this even implies or includes overriding the physician's values,
his discretionary latitude in clinical decisions, and, in some cases, even his
rights of conscience. As patient autonomy receives more and more legal
sanction, the problem of preserving the physician's moral integrity will
grow. This danger is accentuated by the deficiency of "conscience
clauses," which could provide statutory protection for physicians who re-
fuse to provide or participate in procedures they find repugnant on moral
or religious grounds. 8
In the United States, these threats to the physician's autonomy and
18. See Lynn D. Wardle, Protecting the Rights of Conscience of Health Care Providers,
14 J. LEGAL MED. 177 (1993).
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conscience derive from the evolution of autonomy from a negative to a
positive right. The rights of patients to make decisions consistent with
their own values was first noted as a right to refuse unwanted treatment
in 1914.19 In 1976, it was extended to a right of valid surrogates to refuse
life-saving measures over the physician's objections. E' In 1983, the Presi-
dent's Commission extended autonomy to include the right of participa-
tion in "Do Not Resuscitate" orders. This meant that physicians should
offer treatments (like resuscitation) that' patients might want even if they
were not judged medically indicated.21 As a result, the pristine right of
refusal of unwanted treatment is now becoming, for some, a right to de-
mand treatment - even over the doctor's best medical judgment.2" Ele-
vating patients' demands for specific kinds of care to moral status under
the rubric of autonomy poses several challenges to the physician's right to
her own moral integrity.
First, there is the challenge to the physician's judgment of what is good
medicine (i.e., medicine that is rationally sound in diagnosis, prognosis
and therapeutics). For patients to claim a right to any procedures they
wish is to challenge a conscientious physician's integrity as a physician. It
depreciates his expertise, reduces his discretionary latitude in decision-
making, and makes him a technical instrument of another person's
wishes. What is more important is that this can pose a risk to the pa-
tient's well-being and subvert the healing purpose for which medicine is
intended in the first place. What is demanded may not be indicated, ef-
fective or beneficial. Such demands violate the internal morality of
medicine as a practice.23 They can redound to the patient's harm by un-
dermining the physician's moral obligation to provide sound advice and
sound practice and to avoid medically useless or futile treatments.
This threat is especially pressing today in the debate over medical futil-
ity and who defines it. Some would do away with the concept entirely
because they consider that defining "futility" is not, and cannot be, an
19. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosps., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
20. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
21. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT: A REPORT OF THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT
DECISIONS 241 (1983).
22. In re Wanglie, No. Px-91-283 (D. Minn. July, 1991).
23. For a further discussion of the morality issues in medicine, see John Ladd, The
Internal Morality of Medicine: An Essential Dimension of the Patient-Physician Relation-
ship, in THE CLINICAL ENCOUNTER: THE MORAL FABRIC OF THE PATIENT-PHYSICIAN
RELATIONSHIP 209 (Earl E. Shelp ed., 1983).
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objective determination. They argue that the idea of futility is so
freighted with both the patient's and physician's values that it should be
abandoned entirely.24 Others would retain the concept only for obvious
situations of total brain death, permanent vegetative state, far advanced
malignant disease,25 or when a treatment has failed in the last 100 cases.26
Still others would institutionalize the criteria for futility in hospital poli-
cies that would bind the physician to compliance. 27 Underlying this de-
bate is the challenge to the physician's expertise to determine when a
treatment - or all treatment - is useless, ineffective or not indicated
because the healing, caring, or curing ends of medicine can no longer be
attained. One of the Hippocratic Authors made it an ethical obligation
for the physician and the patient 28 to desist from treatment when the lim-
its of medicine's power had been reached.
This limitation on the clinician's discretionary latitude in the use of
medical knowledge and skills is especially dangerous when dealing with
surrogate decisions for incompetent patients. Do patients or surrogates
really know what doing "everything possible" means? Must we respect
orders for "no tubes" or "extraordinary measures" when these may well
be effective and beneficial and might have been desired if the patient
were now competent? Did the previously competent patient really in-
tend to foreswear such measures? Is it ever possible in a living will or
medical directive to anticipate what one would wish at the moment of
actual decisionmaking? Must vigorous, ineffective, burdensome, and fu-
tile treatment be continued because the living will or surrogate requires
it?
These difficulties do not vitiate living wills or surrogate decisions by
those with a durable power of attorney for health. They do warrant cau-
tion about the content of autonomy and its actualization in particular
cases in which there is doubt about what the patient wanted to be done.
They alert us to the fact that the physician's discretion can be so restricted
by advance directives that the patient's welfare is compromised. More-
over, a mistaken respect for autonomy or the physician's fear of violating
24. R.D. Truog et al., The Problem with Futility, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1560 (1992).
25. Stuart J. Youngner, Who Defines Futility?, 260 JAMA 2094 (1988).
26. Nancy S. Jecker & Lawrence J. Schneiderman, Medical Futility: The Duty Not to
Treat, 2 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 151 (1993).
27. Lance K. Stell, Stopping Treatment on Grounds of Futility: A Role for Institutional
Policy, 11 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 481 (1992).
28. Hippocrates, The Art, in 2 HIPPOCRATES 185-217 (W.H.S. Jones trans., 1981).
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autonomy becomes an excuse for moral detachment, which is actually
moral abandonment.
The physician is accorded discretionary latitude in clinical decisions be-
cause medical knowledge must be applied to individual cases. The care of
individual cases is not reduced to a set formula, but rather must be modu-
lated by a host of clinical and personal factors peculiar to each patient.
Without discretionary latitude, the physician cannot personalize and indi-
vidualize care; she cannot fulfill her obligation to use her knowledge for
the patient's best interests. Without constraints on discretionary latitude,
the physician's decisions can violate the patient's values or produce physi-
cal harm. The balance between too narrow and too wide a definition of
discretionary space is a delicate, but increasingly important, one to strike.
Another place where physician autonomy is endangered is in the sensi-
tive realm of the physician's religious beliefs. In the future, the secular
trend in our society and the drive for autonomy may converge to place
constraints on the physician's religious convictions and values. Current
legal literature already reflects instances of subtle, and sometimes not so
subtle, coercion of the consciences of nurses and physicians who oppose
or refuse to participate in abortion, sterilization, the use of abortifacient,
or to carry out directives to withdraw feeding tubes.29 Medical students
and residents are under increasing pressure to learn and to participate in
abortion training by practice. Applicants to medical schools are now fre-
quently asked about their views on abortion. No solid data are available
on whether their answers influence the admission committee's or inter-
viewer's decision to accept or reject them. Nevertheless, the question is
asked so often that it seems unlikely to be of only passing interest to
interviewers.
Fortunately, the right of conscientious refusal on grounds of personal
beliefs is currently protected.30 However, past statements of official bod-
ies like the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists with
respect to training in abortion techniques as a condition of residency ap-
proval are worrisome, even though superseded at the present time. 1
Another possible challenge to physician autonomy presents itself in the
current debate about voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide. It seems
very likely, in view of the current drift of public and professional opinion,
29. Wardle, supra note 18.
30. Executive Board Minutes from the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecol-
ogy at 12, Item 6.2 (Jan. 1992) (on file with organization).
31. See Barbara L. Lindheim & Maureen A. Cotterill, Training in Induced Abortion by
Obstetrics and Gynecology Residency Programs, 10 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 24 (1978).
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that one or both of these practices will become legal. When this happens,
these procedures will also very likely become "benefits" or entitlements
in our future health care system. The Clinton Administration is likely to
include abortion among "reproductive services" in its proposed Health
Security Act. Pressures on physicians are then sure to mount to provide
abortions as part of the "benefit package." We are promised that the
rights of conscience of those who find abortion morally reprehensible are
to be protected. However, in a climate of moral pluralism, self-determi-
nation, and consensus ethics, this could change.
I cite these examples not to provoke furious debates about the moral
status of the procedures in question, but because whatever one's position
may be, the moral problem of the integrity of the physician's autonomy
and moral rights of expression of conscience cannot be ignored. If legal
or societal sanction for a certain procedure becomes widespread, will this
warrant violation of the physician's conscience? Some see these as mat-
ters of such societal benefit that the physician's private moral and reli-
gious beliefs should be dissociated from his professional life.32 This will
pose an impossible situation for the morally conscientious Orthodox Jew,
Roman Catholic, or Muslim in certain fields of medicine.
Another challenge to the physician's moral integrity and autonomy is
one encountered by physicians in countries with "managed" health care
systems. The political and economic pressures of health care policy and
reform already place the physician in a position of moral conflict. The
economic and fiscal drive behind such programs can make the physician a
moral accomplice in practices he deems injurious to his patient's well-
being. No matter what setting he is in - cost containment, rationing,
acting as a gatekeeper, an institutional milieu of managed health care or
managed competition, a publicly funded clinic adhering to clinical guide-
lines, etc. - all place the physician in the position of double or triple
agency.
The physician's professional commitment to advocacy for her patient
may put her at odds with an institution's or society's well-being. Exi-
gency, expediency and economics, not ethics, drive such systems. Does
the "autonomy" of the institution or health policy override the autonomy
of either, or both, the patient and physician? How are "good" business,
economic, political and fiscal policy, and the moral purpose of medicine
to be reconciled? Which takes precedence when conflict is unavoidable?
32. This dissociation is one I have encountered already in private conversation with
medical students, colleagues, and influential laypeople.
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Such questions are sure to become more widespread in the future as the
zeal for cost containment and managerial ideologies, rather than the wel-
fare of patients, are enshrined in law and public policy.
IV. PROCEDURAL ETHics AND CONFLIcr RESOLUTION
The central moral issues in any attempt to balance patient and physi-
cian autonomy are substantive. But, when substantive moral issues are
unresolvable, procedures for ethically dealing with the conflict are neces-
sary. The autonomy of patients, their surrogates, and physicians all carry
moral weight and, on that account, command respect. The ethical goal of
any procedure aimed at conflict resolution should be to protect each
agent's autonomy to the extent possible. To this end, a variety of proce-
dural moves are morally plausible when a conflict in moral or profes-
sional values reaches an impasse.
To begin with, the patient or patient's valid surrogate can discharge the
physician and engage one who will take care of the patient on his or her
terms. Alternatively, the physician can withdraw, respectfully and with-
out recrimination, on grounds of preservation of his moral integrity.
However, these alternatives are possible only if another physician is will-
ing to undertake the care of the patient. To withdraw without transfer-
ring care to another competent physician is morally and legally
unacceptable and constitutes abandonment. Hence, the question about
how the transfer should be made arises.
In both situations, patients or surrogates might claim a right to assist-
ance in selection of another physicianspecifically congenial to their moral
values. In cases that do not involve a fundamental moral principle (e.g., a
patient's choice of a "lump" resection and radiation as against radial mas-
tectomy for breast cancer, or the use of non-standard, but not harmful,
medical treatment) such cooperation could be ethically appropriate. The
issue may be more fundamental, however, when it involves voluntary eu-
thanasia, abortion, physician-assisted suicide, or withdrawal of care from
patients in a persistent vegetative state. In such instances, some would
argue that the physician who withdraws has an obligation to find another
physician to undertake the patient's care under the family's or patient's
terms. For others, this would constitute an unacceptable degree of moral
complicity by cooperation in an act one considers morally untenable.33
The most difficult situation, for which there is no totally satisfactory
solution, is when physicians and patients or their surrogates disagree on a
33. Pellegrino, supra note 12.
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serious and fundamental ethical issue and the possibilities of physician
withdrawal, or discharge of the physician by patient or surrogate, are
foreclosed by external circumstances. There may be no physician willing
to undertake care on the patient's or surrogate's terms. No other physi-
cian may be available for reasons of geography or urgency of the clinical
situation or lack of the required expertise. Or, the physician may be em-
ployed in an institutional setting (i.e., prisons, the military, certain man-
aged care plans, or residency training programs), in which physician
choice is limited by virtue of his occupying a specific, socially defined
role. In these settings, failure to perform the expected role (i.e., partici-
pation in state-ordered executions), could result in significant fiscal pen-
alties, discharge from one's job, and legal or disciplinary action.
When there are irreconcilable differences in moral commitments and
the physician cannot extricate herself by reasons of exigency or limita-
tions imposed by patient or society, the physician must still be faithful to
her conscience. This may mean acceptance of the attendant penalties for
refusal to comply with institutional, legal, or socially defined goals (e.g.,
refusal to participate in state-ordered executions or in coerced interroga-
tion of war prisoners). Just when and how individual physicians should
refuse to comply with social conventions is not a matter of precise formu-
lation. No one can enter the mind and heart of another and untangle the
moral psychology of a particular moral choice, but this fact does not viti-
ate judgment about the ethical probity of the act in question.
Some of the most complex and difficult situations occur when surro-
gates are acting for infants whose future values cannot be known.34 In
such cases, the conflict will often be between the surrogate's and the phy-
sician's estimates of what is "best" for the infant. The vagaries of "quality
of life" estimates complicate the issue because of the impossibility of as-
sessing how the infant would make that evaluation when he or she be-
comes aware it must live with the infirmities the physicians prognosticate.
These infirmities are often complex, may result in a life of prolonged
disability and discomfort, and constitute grave emotional, physical and
fiscal burdens for parents and society. In a society propelled by economic
constraint, reluctance to sacrifice material goods even for disabled chil-
dren, and an obsession with physical beauty, it is not uncommon for even
conscientious parents to decide to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
treatment in order to spare the infant a "life of suffering" or poor quality.
34. See Arthur E. Kopelman, Dilemmas in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit, in ETmics
AND MENTAL RETARDATION 243 (Loretta Kopelman & John C. Moskop eds., 1984).
Patient and Physician Autonomy
But "quality of life" and "value of life" are not synonymous terms. The
modern tendency to use them synonymously is a serious point of discord
between secular and religious perspectives on ethical decisions. What is
right and good in these circumstances is problematic and may be inter-
preted in contradictory ways by physicians, nurses, parents, and even gov-
ernmental regulation.35 In these circumstances, we may search for
procedures which will protect the autonomy of all participants, but the
substantive ethical disagreement remains.
When the physician believes the parents' decision would constitute
grave harm to the infant, she has several procedural alternatives. One
alternative is to withdraw and ask the parents to engage another physi-
cian. This would be permissible if the physician did not think that with-
drawal would result in grave moral and physical harm to the infant.
Where the physician might judge otherwise, whether treatment is with-
held or continued, then that is medically futile.36 At such a time, the
physician has an obligation to take whatever measures are available to
avert harm, such as appeal to an ethics committee or, if necessary, to the
courts.
A proponent of absolute parental autonomy might justifiably ask what
moral claim a physician can have to judge, or even question, a parent's
surrogacy rights. This point of view assumes that parents have absolute
dominion over their children and that their decisions will invariably be
benevolent and altruistic; it also ignores the covenantal trust relationship
between the physician and the patient. For a variety of reasons - pride,
shame, or unwillingness to confront the expense, financial and emotional,
of caring for a disabled child - parents may decide to undertreat. On
the other hand, they may opt for futile overtreatment out of lack of infor-
mation, religious conviction, or fear of being in some way responsible for
their infant's death.
Furthermore, the autonomy imputed to parents cannot be absolute.
Physicians and nurses are obliged by virtue of their commitment to the
well-being of their patients to act in the interests of the infant. They
must, of course, appreciate that decisions surrounding the care of very
sick and potentially disabled infants must involve the family. Indeed, in a
35. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (1984)
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (1974)).
36. See Anne Bannon, The Case of the Bloomington Baby, HUM. LiFE REV., Fall 1982,
at 63; Michael McCarthy, Anencephalic Baby's Right to Life?, 342 LANCET 919 (1993);
John J. Paris et al., Physicians' Refusal of Requested Treatment: The Case of Baby L, 322
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1012 (1990).
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real sense, the whole family becomes a "patient," whose collective inter-
ests must be safeguarded. The implications of the decision on the future
lives of the whole family are, therefore, not to be denied; however, these
considerations by themselves do not justify withholding or withdrawing
treatment that is effective, beneficial and not disproportionately
burdensome.
When there is obvious and overt conflict between the good seen by
parents and the medical good of the infant, the obligation is greater to the
most vulnerable person (in this case, the infant). Situations involving
such irreconcilable conflicts of obligation are sometimes unavoidable.
Still, we are obliged to do as much as possible to respect the physician's
obligations as physician as well as the autonomy of surrogates or patients.
Sometimes both cannot be respected without unacceptable compromises,
on one side or the other.
Before such an impasse is reached, all other methods of conflict resolu-
tion should be exhausted. Ethics committees can serve to clarify the is-
sues and perhaps suggest a way in which comPromise could effectively be
reached in a manner that preserves the moral integrity of all the partici-
pants. Appointment of legal guardians and appeals to the courts are far
less satisfactory. In any case, all of these devices address only the proce-
dural resolution of the practical conflict. They certainly do not resolve
the ethical dilemma of conflicting claims to autonomous decisionmaking.
V. THE INTEGRITY OF MEDICAL ETHICS
Some would suggest that the problem is with medical ethics itself, with
the insistence on universal rules of moral conduct on which physicians
base their moral claim to autonomy as physicians. Why not change medi-
cal ethics, itself? Why not leave it to be negotiated between physician
and patient? Perhaps medical ethics should be a changing, socially con-
structed contract varying from society to society, era to era, and patient
to patient. Some argue that medicine and its ethics must be whatever is
negotiated politically between the profession and government. Other so-
cially and politically constructed forms of ethical justification are cur-
rently popular as well. They imply that there is no such thing as a
universally binding medical ethic, only an ethic of political expediency or
societal convention.
Some of us, however, think this would be disastrous for medicine, the
physician, and the patient. The autonomy - that is really to say the
moral integrity - of both physicians and patients must somehow be pre-
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served. So, too, must the integrity of the ethics of medicine itself. Medi-
cal knowledge is too powerful a tool to become an instrument of
governmental or social pressures, or private negotiation, however benign
their motives may appear to be. Medicine is also too powerful to go
wholly unregulated. There are too many examples of the subversion of
the powers of medicine to evil purpose by unjust political regimes to
make the ethics of medicine a subject for political negotiation.37 There
are too many examples of the way unregulated medical "entrepreneurs"
or morally bankrupt physicians can exploit the vulnerability of the sick.
Medical ethics must maintain a degree of independence if it is to pro-
tect the sick person. It must remain subject to public criticism, but not be
controlled by social convention. It must also be protected from subver-
sion by the profession itself. This requires a much firmer philosophical
grounding for medical ethics than we now possess. The possibility of
achieving universal approbation for a commonly held ethic of the profes-
sion seems to be receding today in the face of the multi-cultural, morally
pluralistic, and morally relativistic temper of the times. This climate,
however, cannot justify abandoning the effort. Nothing less is called for
than a reconstruction of the ethics of the relationship between patient
and doctor. This will be difficult, indeed, because the "remarkable soli-
darity" and "singular beneficence," which Osler praised,38 are rapidly dis-
appearing in the worldwide questioning of the moral values that have
traditionally undergirded medical ethics.
I have purposely said little about the principle of justice, which must
also be factored into the equation. On the whole, this facet of the physi-
cian-patient relationship has been underdeveloped. It is now necessary to
establish the conceptual relationships among justice, autonomy, and be-
neficence, as well as their actualization in the clinical context. Justice has
the interesting facet of being both a principle and a virtue. The incorpo-
ration of justice -into the autonomy-beneficence equation will require a
prior clarification of how principles and virtues are conceptually and
practically related..
Despite the difficulties, the effort to balance the autonomy equation is
not futile. Its importance impels us to the effort to try to find the points
of balance. Autonomy and beneficence are two principles so closely tied
to the healing ends of medicine that to violate either is to imperil the
37. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, Societal Duty and Moral Complicity: The Physician's
Dilemma of Divided Loyalty, 1 INT'L J.L. & ETHICS (forthcoming June 1994).
38. William Osler, Chauvinism in Medicine, in AEQUANIMITAS: WITH OTHER AD-
DRESSES TO MEDICAL STUDENTS, NURSES AND PRACTITIONERS OF MEDICINE 267 (1943).
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moral integrity of both patients and physicians. Nevertheless, any com-
prehensive moral philosophy for the health professions must encompass
more than these two principles. Justice must be included and account
taken of both virtue and the moral psychological insights of non-principle
based theories.
In any case, one step in the larger effort is to try to achieve a better
balance between the two most powerful principles shaping physician-pa-
tient relations today. Several precepts need to be built into the current
reexamination of the foundations of professional ethics:
1) Patient autonomy is a moral right of patients, and it is a duty
of physicians to respect it.
2) Integrity of conscience and professional judgement are moral
rights of physicians. Society and patients have an obligation to
respect them.
3) Physician autonomy is limited by a competent patient's or
valid surrogate's moral right to refuse proffered treatment. The
physician is obliged, however, to help the patient arrive at an
autonomous decision by enhancing or empowering the patient's
capacity to make authentic, self-governing choices.
4) The patient's autonomy is limited when it becomes a demand
for treatment the physician honestly believes is not medically
indicated, is injurious to the patient, or is morally repugnant.
5) The physician's autonomy is limited on questions of value,
e.g., on questions of the goals or purposes to which medical
knowledge may be put for particular individuals or societies.
6) Societies and institutions must establish mechanisms, with
only minimal recourse to law, for unilateral discontinuance of
the relationship when either patient or physician feels personal
integrity is being compromised.
7) The first principle of medical ethics is still beneficence. Be-
neficence is essential if autonomy is to be authentically ex-
pressed and actualized.
In sum, beneficence and autonomy must be mutually re-enforcing if the
patient's good is to be served, if the physician's ability to serve that good
is not to be compromised, and if the physician's moral claim to autonomy
and the integrity of the whole enterprise of medical ethics are to be
respected.
